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United States v. Kincade:
Constitutionality of Mandatory DNA
Testing
by JOY HUANG*
I. Introduction
The discovery of Deoxyribonucleic Acid (DNA) not only
revolutionized science, but also our criminal system. DNA is a
molecule comprised of "two nucleotide strands coiled around each
other and connected by rungs, like a twisted ladder," and carries a
person's unique genetic information.' With the improvement of the
DNA analysis processes, DNA has rapidly become valuable evidence
to determine matches between DNA specimens left at a crime scene
and DNA from criminal suspects. Virtually every jurisdiction in the
United States has held that DNA identification evidence is
admissible
II. Growth and Development of DNA Identification
Databases
Much like current nationwide databases of fingerprints, state
repositories of DNA genetic fingerprints of known criminals were
developed to facilitate suspicion-less identification, or "cold hits."
* J.D. Candidate 2005, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; B.A.
2002, University of California, Berkeley. The author is a native Californian, born and
raised in the East Bay. Her interests include Praying Mantis martial arts, ceramics, and
downhill skiing. She would like to thank her family, especially her mother and Wayne
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1. United States v. Kincade, 345 F.3d 1095, 1097 n.2 (9th Cir. 2003), rev'd en banc,
379 F.3d 813 (9th Cir. 2004).
2. PAUL C. GIANNELLI & EDWARD J. IMWINKELREID, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE § 18-
5(A) (3ded. 1999).
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The Federal Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of
1994 authorized the Federal Bureau of Investigation ("FBI") to
create a national database of DNA samples taken from convicted
offenders, crime scenes and victims, and unidentified human remains.'
As a result, the FBI established the Combined DNA Index System
("CODIS"), which allowed states and local forensics laboratories to
exchange and compare DNA profiles electronically.' In so doing, a
national DNA forensic team was created, with all fifty states "having
enacted laws requiring convicted offenders to provide DNA samples
for analysis and entry into the CODIS system."5
Without a federal law regulating the collection and organization
of DNA samples, there were many gaps in the CODIS system; thus,
Congress addressed the problem by passing the DNA Analysis
Backlog Elimination Act of 2000 ("DNA Act") on December 19,
2000.6 At the same time, Congress amended the supervised release
statute to require all eligible defendants to comply with the DNA
Act.7 The DNA Act currently permits the FBI to take DNA samples
from the individuals convicted of federal crimes of violence, robbery,
and burglary, and authorizes the information gathered from the
samples to be added to the CODIS system.8 The DNA Act requires
those in federal custody, on parole, on probation, or on supervised
release to provide a DNA sample.9 It also requires all such persons to
submit to the nonconsensual withdrawal of blood by governmental
authorities, as cooperation by qualifying individuals in the collection
of the DNA sample is "a condition of that probation, parole, or
supervised release."1° Refusal to provide a DNA sample subjects an
individual to a misdemeanor penalty.11
Once taken, the DNA sample is turned over to the FBI, which
carries out an analysis and includes the results in CODIS.12  The
3. See 42 U.S.C. § 14132 (2004).
4. See 42 U.S.C. § 14135 (2004).
5. Mark A. Rothstein et al., Legal and Policy Issues in Expanding the Scope of Law
Enforcement DNA Data Banks, 67 BROOK. L. REV. 127, 131 (2001) (introducing the
history of nationwide DNA databases).
6. See United States v. Reynard, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1149 n.4 (S.D. Cal. 2002)
(outlining legislative history concerning gaps in CODIS coverage).
7. See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d) (2004).
8. See 42 U.S.C. § 14135a (2004).
9. See § 14135a(a)(2).
10. See 42 U.S.C. § 14135c (2004).
11. See § 14135a(a)(5).
12. See § 14135a(b).
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genetic markers contained in the DNA sample serve as a genetic
fingerprint, uniquely identifying an individual, but they do not convey
any other information about the person, such as physical or medical
characteristics.' 3 The only allowable use of the DNA samples taken
pursuant to the DNA Act is for federal, state and local law
enforcement to match DNA taken from a crime scene to DNA in the
system to procure a suspect. 4
11. Constitutional Challenges and Judicial Disagreement
While these databases have greatly improved law enforcement,
the statutes forming them have not gone unchallenged. Nevertheless,
other than United States v. Miles"5 and the first Ninth Circuit decision
of United States v. Kincade,6 all legal challenges to the state laws
establishing DNA databanks, even those with broader scope, have
been unsuccessful.17 In fact, every other federal court to review DNA
sampling laws has upheld these laws as constitutional."
This note focuses specifically on United States v. Kincade. The
case involves two successive Ninth Circuit Court decisions, beginning
with the October 2, 2003 controversial decision by a three-judge
panel, which deemed the DNA Act unconstitutional. 9 The decision
was subsequently vacated and reheard by the Ninth Circuit sitting en
banc, in which the Circuit Court affirmed Kincade's convictions and
13. United States v. Reynard, 220 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1153 (S.D. Cal. 2002).
14. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 14132, 14135(c), 14135e (2004).
15. United States v. Miles, 228 F. Supp. 2d 1130 (E.D. Cal. 2002).
16. United States v. Kincade, 345 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 2003) rev'd en banc, 379 F.3d 813
(9th Cir. 2004).
17. Rothstein, supra note 5, at 128 (discussing the general trend of cases dealing with
DNA statutes).
18. See Roe v. Marcotte, 193 F.3d 72, 76-82 (2d Cir. 1999) (upholding Connecticut
DNA sampling statute against Fourth Amendment challenge); Schlicher v. Peters, 103
F.3d 940, 943 (10th Cir. 1996) (upholding Kansas DNA sampling statute against Fourth
Amendment challenge); Boling v. Romer, 101 F.3d 1336, 1339-40 (10th Cir. 1996)
(upholding Colorado DNA sampling statute against Fourth Amendment challenge); Rise
v. Oregon, 59 F.3d 1556 (9th Cir. 1995) (upholding Oregon's statute); Jones v. Murray, 962
F.2d 302, 305-08 (4th Cir. 1992) (upholding Virginia's DNA sampling statute against
Fourth Amendment challenge); Reynard, 220 F. Supp. at 1142 (S.D. Cal. 2002) (upholding
DNA Act against Fourth Amendment challenge); Shelton v. Gudmanson, 934 F. Supp.
1048, 1050-51 (W.D. Wis. 1996) (upholding Wisconsin DNA sampling statute against
Fourth Amendment challenge); Kruger v. Erickson, 875 F. Supp. 583, 588-89 (D. Minn.
1995) (upholding Minnesota DNA sampling law against Fourth Amendment challenge);
Ryncarz v. Eikenberry, 824 F. Supp. 1493, 1498-1500 (E.D. Wash. 1993) (upholding
Washington DNA sampling statute against Fourth Amendment challenge).
19. Kincade, 345 F.3d at 1113.
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found the DNA Act constitutional.0 This note was originally written
in the wake of the first controversial ruling by the Ninth Circuit
decided in October of 2003, and it speculated as to the validity of the
decision. Investigating how past courts dealt with the relevant Fourth
Amendment issues surrounding suspicionless searches of parolees
and subjecting the facts of Kincade to the various applicable
constitutional Fourth Amendment tests, I concluded that the October
2003 Ninth Circuit decision should and would be vacated or
overturned. These predictions were fulfilled when the case was
vacated in August of 2004 by the Ninth Circuit sitting en banc, with
the majority opinion applying substantially similar tests and
addressing many of the concerns raised in the original Note.
However, what was not anticipated was the closeness of the 2004
decision: in an eleven-judge panel, five of the justices dissented.
Instead of being yet another anomalous decision by the Ninth Circuit,
the issues raised by Kincade were less clear cut and more closely
contested than I expected. Between the justices, there was a
fundamental struggle between different perceptions of the goals of
the DNA Act and the breadth of the possible ramifications of
upholding the Act as constitutional. The majority narrowly construed
the application of the decision to parolees, finding deterrence of
parolees from repeat offenses as one of the main goals of the DNA
Act. The dissent, on the other hand, warned of the expansive
potential use of Fourth Amendment exceptions as pretextual
justifications for infringing the rights of all citizens. Despite the fact
that virtually all courts in the United States are in agreement
regarding the constitutionality of the DNA Act, there are still strong
differences of judicial opinion as to issues surrounding the Act, even
within the same Circuit.
Using United States v. Kincade as its focus, this note will explore
the issues surrounding the DNA Act, and will speculate as to possible
reasons why the Ninth Circuit is still much divided on the issue of
mandatory DNA extractions of parolees. To better understand the
majority and dissent's respective positions, this note begins with an
overview of the constitutional law of Fourth Amendment searches
with respect to blood extraction. This note will then outline the
proper analysis a court should use to evaluate the constitutionality of
statutes like the DNA Act, in requiring mandatory blood extractions
from parolees. After providing an overview of the facts in Kincade,
20. United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 839-840 (9th Cir. 2004).
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this note will present my original analysis of the facts and the
constitutionality of the DNA Act, while, at the same time, keeping in
mind the Ninth Circuit's reasoning behind its 2003 ruling and relevant
decisions by other courts. In particular, this note will explore the
Ninth Circuit's prior decision of Rise v. Oregon,21 which the Ninth
Circuit overturned in their October 2003 decision but later reaffirmed
in their August 2004 decision. Finally, this note will focus on the
August 2004 decision by the Ninth Circuit sitting en banc, and explore
the reasons behind the strong underlying tensions between the
justices resulting in the close decision.
IV. The Fourth Amendment and the Forced Extraction of
Blood as a Search
Applying to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment, 2 the
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution prohibits
unreasonable searches and seizures:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons
or things to be seized.
The Supreme Court has interpreted the Fourth Amendment as
establishing rules and presumptions that limit the government's
ability to intrude upon matters of personal privacy. 4 What a person
seeks to preserve as private is constitutionally protected, according to
the Supreme Court in Katz v. United States.25 The Katz standard
requires that a person have a subjective expectation of privacy, and
that this expectation be one that society would recognize as
21. 59 F.3d at 1556.
22. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (providing that no State shall "deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws").
23. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
24. See Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326, 330 (2001).
25. 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967).
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reasonable.26 Thus, the Court has recognized that the Fourth
Amendment is implicated whenever a government's search infringes
upon an individual's reasonable expectation of privacy.27
The search at issue in Kincade involves the forced extraction of
blood, mandated by the DNA Act for the collection of DNA samples
to augment the nationwide DNA database. As the DNA Act does
not prescribe any particular method for collecting DNA samples and
as blood extraction is the standard method of gathering DNA, this
note will focus solely on blood extraction, rather than inquiring into
other possibly less intrusive methods. 8 The first inquiry a court must
make is whether the forced extraction is a search under the Fourth
Amendment, requiring constitutional scrutiny. The Supreme Court
has determined that a compulsory blood extraction is a search, as it
intrudes on the private sphere of the physical body and infringes upon
an individual's "most personal and deep-rooted expectations of
privacy. ' 9 The Court reaffirms this determination in Schmerber v.
California by stating, "[blood] testing procedures plainly constitute
searches of 'persons' ... within the meaning of [the Fourth]
Amendment."' In fact, the Court has "long recognized that a
compelled intrusion into the body for blood" must be deemed a
Fourth Amendment search."
V. Proper Analysis to Determine Constitutionality of the
Fourth Amendment Search
Not only are mandatory blood extractions in pursuant of the
DNA Act Fourth Amendment searches, but they are also suspicion-
less searches. There is no "requirement that the sample be taken in
order to aid in the investigation of a particular crime," nor is
"suspicion that an individual will commit or has committed another
offense" required.32 A search or seizure is ordinarily unreasonable in
the absence of individualized suspicion of wrongdoing, and
unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment.33 However, as "the
26. Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
27. Id.
28. See 42 U.S.C. § 14135 (2004).
29. Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760 (1985).
30. 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966).
31. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 603 (1989).
32. United States v. Kincade, 345 F.3d 1095, 1097 (9th Cir. 2003).
33. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 308 (1997).
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Fourth Amendment imposes no irreducible requirement' 3  of
individualized suspicion, the Supreme Court has upheld searches in
multiple contexts, despite a lack of individualized suspicion.35  The
Court has carved out a separate and limited exception, called the
"special needs" exception, to be used for "exceptional circumstances
in which special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement,
make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.,
36
In determining the constitutionality of a suspicion-less search, a
court would first need to look at the totality of the circumstances of
the particular case.37 Regarding the next step in the analysis,
precedent has been inconsistent with some courts using the
traditional balancing test under the Fourth Amendment," and others
relying exclusively on the "special needs" doctrine.39 To evaluate the
constitutionality of suspicion-less searches, the proper sequence of
analysis courts currently use, and this note will use, is to begin with an
analysis of the applicability of the "special needs" exception.n
° Only
after the "special needs" analysis should a court then apply the
traditional Fourth Amendment balancing test.41
Beginning with the "special needs" analysis, a court must answer
34. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561 (1976).
35. See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 664-65 (1995) (drug
testing of high school student athletes); Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444
(1990) (suspicion-less sobriety automobile checkpoints); Nat'l Treasury Employees Union
v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) (drug testing of federal customs officers who carry arms
or who are involved in drug interdiction); Skinner, 489 U.S. at 633-34 (drug testing of
railroad employees); Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 543 (suspicion-less automobile
checkpoints for illegal aliens).
36. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325,351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
37. Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33, 34 (1996).
38. See Boling v. Romer, 101 F.3d 1336, 1340 (10th Cir. 1996); Rise v. Oregon, 59 F.3d
1556, 1559 (9th Cir. 1995); Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 307-08 (4th Cir. 1992); Kruger v.
Erickson, 875 F. Supp. 583, 588-89 (D. Minn. 1995), affd on other grounds, 77 F.3d 1071
(8th Cir. 1996); Sanders v. Coman, 864 F. Supp. 496, 499 (E.D.N.C. 1994); Ryncarz v.
Eikenberry, 824 F. Supp. 1493, 1498-99 (E.D. Wash. 1993); People v. Wealer, 636 N.E.2d
1129, 1135 (Ill. App. Ct. 1994); State v. Maas, 64 P.3d 382, 389 (Kan. 2003); Landry v.
Attorney General, 709 N.E.2d 1085, 1093 (Mass. 1999); Cooper v. Gammon, 943 S.W.2d
699, 704-705 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997); State ex rel. Juvenile Dep't of Multnomah County v.
Orozco (In re Orozco), 878 P.2d 432, 435-36 (Or. Ct. App. 1994); Dial v. Vaughn, 733 A.2d
1, 6-7 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1999); Johnson v. Commonwealth, 529 S.E.2d 769, 779 (Va. 2000);
Doles v. State, 994 P.2d 315, 318-19 (Wyo. 1999).
39. See Roe v. Marcotte, 193 F.3d 72, 79-82 (2d Cir. 1999); Shelton v. Gudmanson,
934 F. Supp. 1048, 1050-51 (W.D. Wis. 1996); State v. Olivas, 856 P.2d 1076, 1086 (Wash.
1993).
40. Liakis v. Goord, 689 N.Y.S.2d 595 (N.Y. 1999).
41. Id.
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the question as to whether "special governmental needs beyond the
normal need for law enforcement" exists.4 ' To evaluate whether the
"special needs" exception applies, a court first must determine the
purpose of the statute. This determination has become more
complicated after City of Indianapolis v. Edmond and Ferguson v.
City of Charleston,' two Supreme Court cases which arguably narrow
the applicability of the "special needs" exception. Edmond and
Ferguson involved searches pursuant to "special needs" in the law
enforcement context, and the Court held the searches in both cases
unconstitutional, as they impermissibly served law enforcement
purposes. After the Court's rulings of Edmond and Ferguson, the
main contention with respect to searches in pursuant of augmenting
national DNA databases is whether the suspicion-less search is
conducted for law enforcement purposes. The exception's
applicability depends on the careful definition of the DNA database
statute's purpose, which can arguably be construed either way. If a
court determines that a suspicion-less search was done for law
enforcement purposes, the "special needs" exception does not apply
and the search is unconstitutional, as individualized suspicion is
required for any search or seizure done to assist law enforcement in
the investigation or the solving of crimes. '
If the "special needs" exception does apply, the court still needs
to evaluate the reasonableness of the search under the circumstances,
as the Fourth Amendment only allows searches that are reasonable.47
A court would evaluate the search under traditional Fourth
Amendment analysis, assessing "on the one hand, the degree to which
it intrudes upon an individual's privacy and, on the other, the degree
to which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental
interests." 8 With respect to mandatory blood extractions for the
purposes of DNA databases, nearly all courts have found suspicion-
less extraction of DNA to be a reasonable search, as the privacy
interests implicated by the search are minimal and an important
governmental interest furthered by the intrusion would be placed in
42. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665 (1989).
43. 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
44. 532 U.S. 67 (2001).
45. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 47-8; Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 85-6.
46. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 67; Edmond, 531 U.S. at 32.
47. Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250 (1991). See also Illinois v. McArthur, 531
U.S. 326, 330 (2001) (citing Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730, 739 (1983)).
48. Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999).
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jeopardy by a requirement of individualized suspicion. 9 With respect
to Kincade, the constitutionality of the search at issue depends on
whether a court would find the mandatory blood extraction
reasonable under the circumstances.
This note will perform its own analysis according to the steps
delineated above, examining the facts of Kincade and the
constitutionality of mandatory extractions of blood pursuant to the
DNA Act. Many of the contentious issues, such as the definition of
the DNA Act's purpose, were central to Kincade's outcome and will
be explored in detail.
VI. United States v. Kincade: Facts and Initial Ninth Circuit
Ruling on October 2,2003
"On September 1, 1993, Kincade pled guilty to one count of
armed bank robbery and the use of a firearm."50 On January 4, 1994,
the District Court sentenced him to 97 months, which was to be
followed by a three-year term of supervised release."' On August 4,
2000, Kincade was released from prison.52 Pursuant to the DNA Act,
the Probation Office ordered him to submit to a blood extraction for
DNA analysis in March 2002."3 Kincade was subject to the DNA Act
because the felony armed bank robbery offense, to which he pled
guilty, is one of the specified offenses covered by the Act.
4 Kincade
refused to obey the order.55 The failure "to cooperate in the
collection of [a] sample" under the DNA Act is a class A
misdemeanor.56  The District Court rejected Kincade's Fourth
Amendment constitutional challenge and found that his refusal to
submit to the mandatory blood extraction ordered by the Probation
Office constituted a violation of the terms of his supervised release.
57
The District Court sentenced Kincade to four months in custody for
the violation and ordered that supervised release continue for an
additional two-year term.5 8
49. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 624 (1989).
50. United States v. Kincade, 345 F.3d 1095, 1098 (9th Cir. 2003).
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. 42 U.S.C. § 14135a(d)(1) (2004).
55. Kincade, 345 F.3d at 1098.
56. See § 14135a(a)(5)(A).
57. Kincade, 345 F.3d at 1098.
58. Id.
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A three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed the District
Court's ruling on October 2, 2003.'9 In a 2-1 decision, the Ninth
Circuit held that mandatory DNA collection under the DNA Act: (1)
violates an individual's right to privacy over one's body,' (2) requires
individualized suspicion," and (3) does not fall within the "special
needs" doctrine because the DNA primarily serves a law enforcement
62interest. Thus, the Ninth Circuit found the DNA Act
unconstitutional.
VII. Applicability of the "Special Needs" Exception
A. The Development of the "Special Needs" Exception
As mentioned above, the Supreme Court has authorized
searches in the absence of individualized suspicion of wrongdoing,
even when bodily intrusion is involved.6 Under the "special needs"
exception, the typical warrant and probable cause requirements are
relaxed, as the government need not have individualized suspicion of
wrongdoing when conducting a search. 6 When "special needs" are
alleged, courts must undertake a context specific inquiry to determine
whether there are "special needs, beyond the normal need for law
enforcement.'65
The seminal case on the "special needs" exception is Skinner v.
Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n.6 The Supreme Court upheld mandatory
drug testing of railroad employees without a warrant, without
probable cause, and without individualized suspicion.67  The Court
found that: the testing was minimally intrusive; the government
employees' participation in the regulated industry lessened
59. Id. at 1113.
60. Id. at 1102.
61. Id. at 1103.
62. Id. at 1104.
63. See, e.g., Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 664-65 (1995) (drug
testing of high school student athletes); Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444(1990) (suspicion-less sobriety automobile checkpoints); Nat'l Treasury Employees Union
v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) (drug testing of federal customs officers who carry arms
or who are involved in drug interdiction); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489
U.S. 602, 633-34 (1989) (drug testing of railroad employees); United States v. Martinez-
Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (suspicion-less automobile checkpoints for illegal aliens).
64. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37 (1967).
65. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987).
66. See generally Skinner, 489 U.S. at 602.
67. Id. at 634.
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expectations of privacy; and the interest in public safety outweighed
the privacy concerns of the individual employees.6' The purpose of
the regulation requiring the testing was not to assist in the
prosecution of employees, but rather to further the government's
special need to investigate accidents and to prevent injuries that could
result if employees were impaired by drugs or alcohol.69 Under the
circumstances, the Court reasoned, requiring a warrant would not
provide protection against arbitrary random government acts because
the standardized testing regulations themselves left no facts for a
neutral magistrate to evaluate." Thus, in special needs cases, where
administrative needs outweigh law enforcement needs, no
particularized suspicion is needed as long as the search is minimally
intrusive and the government interest is strong.7" Like Skinner, many
cases applying the "special needs" exception involve searches
"conducted by officials other than the police, in situations where the
government's purpose would be frustrated by requiring probable
cause."72 What becomes problematic is when the suspicion-less search
is arguably tied to law enforcement purposes, as seen in Edmond and
Ferguson.
The two recent cases, City of Indianapolis v. Edmond73 and
Ferguson v. City of Charleston,74 refine the "special needs" exception.
These cases involved regulatory schemes that were more closely
related to law enforcement interests. In Edmond, the Indianapolis
police used drug checkpoints, where motorists were briefly stopped
for questioning while a drug sniffing dog and police officers inspected
the vehicles.75 The Court considered whether these checkpoints
subjected motorists to seizure in violation of the Fourth
Amendment.76 The Court found that despite the effectiveness of the
program, its only purpose was for detecting general criminal activity,
impermissible without individualized suspicion.
68. Id. at 633-34.
69. Id. at 620-21.
70. Id. at 622.
71. Id. at 619.
72. Rothstein, supra note 5, at 138 (discussing situations where the government's
purpose would be frustrated by probable cause).
73. 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
74. 532 U.S. 67 (2001).
75. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 35.
76. Id. at 34.
77. Id. at 41-42.
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The Court in Ferguson further refined Edmond. At issue in
Ferguson was the constitutionality of a state hospital's performance of
a diagnostic test to obtain evidence of a patient's criminal conduct for
law enforcement purposes.7  Concerned about cocaine use by
pregnant patients and having failed with programs that did not
alleviate the problem, a public hospital in Charleston, South Carolina
took stronger measures. 79 The hospital "began to order drug screens
to be performed on urine samples from maternity patients who were
suspected of using cocaine."'  At first, the hospital merely used
positive results for counseling and treatment.81 Soon, the hospital
offered its "cooperation in prosecuting mothers whose children tested
positive for drugs at birth."'' If a woman in labor tested positive for
drugs, "the police were to be notified without delay and the patient
promptly arrested."83 If a pregnant woman not yet in labor tested
positive, "the police were to be notified.., only if the patient tested
positive for cocaine a second time or if she missed an appointment
with a substance abuse counselor."' A jury ruled in favor of the
city.85  On appeal, the Fourth Circuit affirmed under the "special
needs" exception, finding the drug screens were searches for medical
reasons, independent of an objective to help law enforcement.'
The Supreme Court reversed and distinguished Ferguson from
previous cases, as "the central and indispensable feature of
[Charleston's] policy from its inception was the use of law
enforcement to coerce the patients into substance abuse treatment." 8
The Court acknowledged the city's argument that its "ultimate
purpose [of] protecting the health of both the mother and child.., is
a beneficent one." Yet, the Court was not persuaded and it carried
out a "close review" of the program, looking at the "programmatic
purpose" and whether the "purpose actually served"' is "ultimately
78. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 69.
79. Id. at 70.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 72.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 74.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 80.
88. Id. at 81.
89. ld.
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indistinguishable from the general interest in crime control."96 While
the ultimate goal of the program may have been to help women get
off of drugs, the Court found the immediate objective of the searches
was to generate evidence for law enforcement purposes in order to
reach that goal. 9' This was constitutionally unacceptable.
After Edmond and Ferguson, the government has an arguably
harder task of showing some other significant government interest in
the form of special needs beyond normal law enforcement to render
the "special needs" exception applicable. There is no doubt that the
government has a "special need" for ordering felons to provide DNA
samples. A suspicion-based standard would render a meaningful
DNA index system impossible because the government would need
to have evidence of a fresh crime before a DNA sample could be
obtained, "placing in jeopardy... important governmental
interests." 92 However, no matter how dire the need for the statute,
the "special need" cannot be for law enforcement purposes.93
The Ninth Circuit in Kincade construed that the DNA Act's
purpose in obtaining DNA material for future use in a DNA
databank is to help solve future crimes, which is an impermissible
goal of general crime control.9' Most courts addressing the issue of
the constitutionality of statutes like the DNA Act do not agree with
the Ninth Circuit's determination. One of the reasons for such
differing judgments is the malleability of the meaning of the statute's
"'purpose."
B. Looking to the Ultimate Goal Rather than the Immediate Purpose
Justice Kennedy, concurring in the Ferguson case but disagreeing
as to the rationale for the decision, illustrated how disparate results
can be depending on which "purpose" a court chooses for
constitutional analysis.95  Justice Kennedy disagreed with the
majority's fixation on the immediate purpose in Ferguson, and found
the distinction between the ultimate goal and immediate purpose of
the policy at issue "lacking in foundation" in special needs cases.96
90. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44 (2000).
91. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 83-4.
92. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 624 (1989).
93. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
94. United States v. Kincade, 345 F.3d 1095, 1110 (9th Cir. 2003) rev'd en banc, 379
F.3d 813 (9th Cir. 2004).
95. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 86-87.
96. Id. at 87.
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Justice Kennedy pointed out that all of the Court's "special needs
cases have turned upon ... the policy's ultimate goal."97
Justice Kennedy provides three examples of special needs cases
which would have resulted in different outcomes had the Court
examined the immediate purpose rather than the ultimate goal.98 In
Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, addressed in detail above, if
the Court had looked to immediate purposes, the Court would have
identified the "special need" to be the collection of evidence of drug
and alcohol use by railway employees. The Court, instead, identified
the "special need" as the ultimate purpose of the government
"regulating the conduct of railroad employees to ensure [railroad]
safety."99
In Treasury Employees v. Von Raab, the Court reviewed the
constitutionality of drug testing federal customs officers who carry
arms or who are involved in drug interdiction.1" Requiring the Court
to look at the immediate purpose would have forced the Court to
deem the gathering of evidence of drug abuse by prospective drug
interdiction officers as the "special need."'' 1  Instead, the special
needs the Court identified were the necessities "to deter drug use
among those eligible for promotion to sensitive positions within the
[US Customs] Service and to prevent the promotion of drug users to
those positions.""
In Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, the Court evaluated the
constitutionality of conducting drug tests on high school student
athletes.103 Requiring the Court to look at the immediate purpose
would have made the Court deem the purpose of gathering evidence
of drug use by student-athletes as the relevant "need" for purposes of
the "special needs" analysis. °4 Instead, the Court sustained the policy
as furthering what would have been the policy's ultimate goal:
"[d]eterring drug use by our Nation's schoolchildren," and
particularly by student athletes, because "the risk of immediate
physical harm to the drug user or those with whom he is playing his
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 620 (1989).
100. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
101. Id. at 666.
102. Id.
103. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
104. Id. at 653.
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sport is particularly high."1 °5
As Justice Kennedy points out, the immediate purpose of a
search policy is almost always to collect evidence."° Thus, looking to
the immediate purpose of a statute does not uncover much about the
need it serves, since gathering evidence in and of itself is clearly not a
special need which a court would use to justify the search. 07
As applied to Kincade, the Ninth Circuit in its 2003 decision read
Edmond and Ferguson to hold that whenever "special needs" are at
issue, the key inquiry for a reviewing court is the immediate purpose
of the search.1 8 The Ninth Circuit found the immediate purpose of
the DNA Act was to further the goals of law enforcement.1
Believing that the Fourth Amendment flatly prohibits all suspicion-
less searches made for "the purpose of 'detecting evidence of
ordinary criminal wrongdoing,"' the Ninth Circuit in Kincade found
the DNA Act violated the Fourth Amendment." One cannot argue
with the Ninth Circuit that the immediate purpose of the statute is to
gather evidence to solve future and past crimes, clearly a law
enforcement purpose.
However, one could apply Justice Kennedy's argument and
maintain that courts should focus on the ultimate purpose of the
DNA statute, as it is the only meaningful way of getting at the true
"special needs" of the statute. There are many "ultimate purposes"
of the DNA Act. As the text of the Act makes clear, the DNA Act's
main purpose is not to prosecute the individual providing the DNA
sample, but to fill a gap in the CODIS database. "' Another ultimate
purpose is to deter offenders who commit crimes with a high rate of
recidivism."2 The DNA Act also helps crack open unsolved crimes or
"cold cases" and maintains a permanent identification record for
identifying felons who may have otherwise changed their identity. "
Moreover, the presence of the DNA databank improves the accuracy
of criminal prosecutions, and thus can help exonerate innocent
105. Id. at 661-62.
106. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 87 (2001).
107. Id. at 87-88.
108. United States v. Kincade, 345 F.3d 1095, 1111-12 (9th Cir. 2003).
109. Id. at 1110-11.
110. Id. at 1115 (quoting City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 41 (2000)).
111. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 14135a(a)(2), 14135a(b) (2004).
112. Rothstein, supra note 5, at 143 (discussing the purposes of the DNA Act).
113. Id.
114. Kincade, 345 F.3d at 1103.
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suspects."5 These various purposes of the statute do not fall into the
category of law enforcement, and if a court were to look at the
ultimate purpose of the DNA Act, it would likely hold the "special
need" exception applies.
C. The Immediate Purpose Test Might Not Apply to Parolees
Even if a court were to follow the Ninth Circuit and the majority
in Ferguson and look to the immediate purpose of the statute, there
still are other arguments against finding an impermissible law
enforcement purpose. One can argue that Edmond and Ferguson are
distinguishable from Kincade. Edmond did not involve the
diminished Fourth Amendment rights of parolees. Rather, Edmond
involved any ordinary citizen who happened to be traveling on a
highway near Indianapolis. Ferguson also involved the Fourth
Amendment rights of ordinary citizens rather than the reduced
Fourth Amendment rights of parolees.
In Griffin v. Wisconsin, the Supreme Court made it clear that the
"special needs" doctrine applied to parolees."6 The Court recognized
that parolees enjoy less constitutional protection than others, and that
the Fourth Amendment permits "a degree of impingement upon
privacy that would not be constitutional if applied to the public at
large."'"7 The Court then held that law enforcement could search a
parolee's home without a warrant or even probable cause so long as it
was conducted according to a valid regulation governing parolees."8
For searches of parolees, the Supreme Court repeatedly has
recognized that "[i]n assessing the governmental interest side of the
balance, it must be remembered that 'the very assumption of the
institution of probation' is that the [parolee] is more likely than the
ordinary citizen to violate the law."'. 9 Even the Ninth Circuit has
stated that "offenders enjoy a reduced expectation of privacy while
on supervised release."'2°
As Edmond and Ferguson do not address the reduced Fourth
Amendment rights of parolees, the "immediate purpose" test,
115. Id. at 1112.
116. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987).
117. Id. at 875.
118. Id. at 880. See also United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 121 (2001) (recognizing
that parolees have less Fourth Amendment protection than law-abiding citizens, and that
probation officer may search a parolee's home based upon reasonable suspicion).
119. Knights, 534 U.S. at 120 (quoting Griffin, 483 U.S. at 880).
120. United States v. Conway, 122 F.3d 841, 842 (9th Cir. 1997).
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designed to protect law abiding citizens, arguably does not apply
when parolees are involved. With this interpretation, there are no
concerns about suspicion-less searches of law abiding citizens when
the searches target only those in prison, on probation, or on
supervised release, as such felons do not enjoy the "absolute liberty to
which every citizen is entitled." ''
However, one can argue that parolees still have a legitimate
expectation of privacy in their bodies. Parolees' Fourth Amendment
rights are less only to the extent that the regulation has a reasonable
relation to a "legitimate penological interest" in depriving the felon of
the full protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment. 22 Without a
legitimate penological interest, parolees have the same Fourth
Amendment rights as all other citizens. Examples of these interests
are maintaining internal order and discipline in prison, assuring
security by preventing unauthorized access to or escape from prison,
and fostering rehabilitation and deterrence of crime."2
If a court followed Ferguson and the Ninth Circuit's 2003
decision in looking to the immediate purpose, a government interest
in prosecuting crimes does not qualify as a legitimate penological
interest in depriving the felon of all his Fourth Amendment rights.
On the other hand, if a court looked to the ultimate purpose, which
Justice Kennedy advocates, many purposes would qualify as
legitimate penological interests, such as deterrence of crime to protect
society from future criminal violations. Again, whether or not a
parolee still has some Fourth Amendment protections with respect to
mandatory blood extractions done in pursuant of the DNA Act
depends upon whether a court would choose the immediate purpose
or ultimate goal as the relevant purpose of the statute.
VIII. Traditional Fourth Amendment Analysis as to the
Reasonableness of the Search
Assuming that the "special needs" exception applies, the search
at issue still must be a reasonable search under the circumstances, and
the next step for a court is to apply the traditional Fourth
Amendment balancing test. As stated above, the reasonableness of a
search is determined by balancing the individual's Fourth
121. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,480 (1972).
122. Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987).
123. See Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822-27 (1974); Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S.
396, 420 (1974).
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Amendment rights against "the promotion of legitimate
governmental interests.
12 1
A. The Level of Invasiveness of the Search
Beginning with an examination of the individual's rights, a court
may want look at the invasiveness of the search to see how much the
search intrudes on a person's privacy.125  One could argue that the
required "intrusion" to obtain a blood sample is very minimal.2 6 The
Supreme Court has stated that blood tests do not "infringe significant
privacy interests, '' 127 are not "an unduly extensive imposition,"" are
commonplace,' 29 and "would not be considered offensive by even
the most delicate."'' ° The Ninth Circuit itself has stated that the fact
that "the gathering of DNA information requires the drawing of
blood rather than inking and rolling a person's fingertips does not
elevate the intrusion upon [one's] Fourth Amendment interests to a
level beyond minimal.'
3
'
One can go as far as maintaining that the "intrusion" is virtually
the same as taking a photograph, apart from the finger prick required
to collect a sample. In fact, the Ninth Circuit in Rise v. Oregon has
analogized DNA evidence to fingerprinting for identification
purposes.32 As DNA samples under the DNA Act are used solely to
provide identification information,'33  and fingerprints also are
"identifying marker[s] unique to the individual from whom the
information is derived," the Ninth Circuit in Rise reasoned that the
identification information from DNA samples is substantially the
same as the identification information gathered from fingerprints.Y
Fingerprinting a convicted felon is not an unconstitutional search;
thus, if the taking of one is permissible, the taking of the other is also
constitutionally permissible.'35
124. Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999).
125. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 618 (1989).
126. Rise v. Oregon, 59 F.3d 1556, 1560 (9th Cir. 1995).
127. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 625.
128. Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 762 (1985).
129. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 771 (1966).
130. Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432, 436 (1957).
131. Rise, 59 F.3d at 1560.
132. Id. at 1559.
133. See 42 U.S.C. § 14135e(a) (2004).
134. Rise, 59 F.3d at 1559.
135. See id.; Landry v. Attorney General, 709 N.E.2d 1085 (Mass. 1999).
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The analogy between fingerprints and DNA evidence, however,
is not watertight. Fingerprinting and blood extraction for DNA
samples are fundamentally very different, and these differences
would weaken any attempt to analogize the two identification
methods. Fingerprints are external and in public view, like voice or
physical features, and there is no intrusive invasion of the body to
acquire the fingerprint. Blood, on the other hand, is internal and
requires an intrusion of the body to obtain a sample. The current
standard practice of indefinitely retaining the felon's DNA sample
further undercuts the analogy. Unlike fingerprints, the indefinite
retention fosters the opportunity for misuse or abuse of the samples
and opens the door for possible intrusions on the privacy of the
individuals providing the samples.136
These concerns are not without workable solutions. The
intrusive nature of blood extraction can be ameliorated by the advent
of more efficient and less invasive techniques. The problem of
potential abuses of complete DNA samples can be solved by more
stringent standards of extracting only the identifying portions and
disposing the rest of the information. As with the different ways
courts have treated the taking of blood for identification purposes
versus the taking of fingerprints,"7 it is clearly in the court's discretion
to decide how large of a factor the intrusiveness of the blood
extraction plays in the traditional Fourth Amendment balancing test.
B. The Parolee's Diminished Expectation of Privacy
As stated above, a parolee's privacy interest in his identity is
severely diminished both by his status as a convicted felon as well as
his status as a parolee.' It is up to a court to decide whether the
parolee's expectation of privacy has diminished so much as to render
a blood extraction reasonable. Courts that have addressed the issue
of the constitutionality of DNA databases have held that the
prisoner's rights are so diminished as to be a minimal factor in the
balancing test, and thus, instead, focus on the government's
interests.39
136. Rothstein, supra note 5, at 156 (discussing the dangers of misusing DNA
samples).
137. See Rise, 59 F.3d 1556; United States v. Kincade, 345 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 2003).
138. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868 (1987).
139. See Boling v. Romer, 101 F.3d 1336, 1340 (10th Cir. 1996); Rise, 59 F.3d at 1559;
Jones v. Murray, 962 F.2d 302, 307-308 (4th Cir. 1992); Kruger v. Erickson, 875 F. Supp.
583, 588-89 (D. Minn. 1995), affd on other grounds, 77 F.3d 1071 (8th Cir. 1996); Sanders
v. Coman, 864 F. Supp. 496, 499 (E.D.N.C. 1994); Ryncarz v. Eikenberry, 824 F. Supp.
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C. The Government's Legitimate Interests
As mentioned above, there are many legitimate government
interests furthered by the DNA Act, such as increasing the efficiency
of criminal investigations of crimes, solving crimes, and deterring
recidivism.' Many courts reason that the convicted offender's low
expectation of privacy in his identity is outweighed by the state's
interest in preserving a permanent identification record of convicted
offenders to resolve past and future crimes.14' The Ninth Circuit in its
October 2003 decision did not agree: the court found that the search
constituted a "substantial intrusion on Kincade's legitimate
expectation of privacy," and it was not convinced that the
government's interests outweighed Kincade's personal privacy
interests.42
IX. The 2003 Decision of United States v. Kincade Overturns
Rise v. Oregon
Bearing in mind the above analyses and controversies, this note
will now examine the case Rise v. Oregon in detail, which the Ninth
Circuit in Kincade overturned in its October 2003 decision.' 3 In Rise,
felons challenged Oregon's DNA sampling law on Fourth
Amendment grounds, an argument which the court rejected in finding
the law constitutional." The Ninth Circuit in Rise stated that DNA
sampling requires a minimal intrusion for a blood sample, and "even
in the law enforcement context," minimal intrusions upon a parolee's
Fourth Amendment rights are permissible under certain
circumstances. 45 The court argued that this is because parolees "do
not have the same expectations of privacy in their identifying genetic
information that 'free persons' have.., and [have] lost any legitimate
expectation of privacy in the identifying information derived from the
1493, 1498-99 (E.D. Wash. 1993); People v. Wealer, 636 N.E.2d 1129, 1135 (I11. App. Ct.
1994); State v. Maas, 64 P.3d 382, 389 (Kan. 2003); Landry, 709 N.E.2d at 1085; Cooper v.
Gammon, 943 S.W.2d 699, 704-705 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997); In re Orozco, 878 P.2d 432, 435-
36 (Or. Ct. App. 1994); Dial v. Vaughn, 733 A.2d 1, 6-7 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1999); Johnson v.
Commonwealth, 529 S.E.2d 769, 779 (Va. 2000); Doles v. State, 994 P.2d 315, 318-19
(Wyo. 1999).
140. Roe v. Marcotte, 193 F.3d 72, 77-82 (2d Cir. 1999).
141. See Landry, 709 N.E.2d at 1092.
142. Kincade, 345 F.3d at 1102-03.
143. Rise, 59 F.3d at 1556.
144. Id. at 1559.
145. ld.
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blood sampling.' The Rise court balanced the interests of the
individual and society, and found that the societal interest in DNA
sampling was extremely significant.'47 The Rise court found that not
only would the Oregon DNA law help identify and prosecute
perpetrators of future offenses, but it advanced "the overwhelming
public interest in prosecuting crimes accurately[, as] DNA evidence
can exculpate an accused just as effectively as it can inculpate him."'
8
Balancing these considerations with felons' reduced privacy interests
and the minimal Fourth Amendment intrusion of the DNA
extraction, the Rise court concluded that the Oregon DNA law was
"reasonable and therefore constitutional under the Fourth
Amendment.'
49
A key issue in Kincade is whether or not Rise controls Kincade.
One can argue that Rise does control Kincade, and under Rise, the
DNA Act passes constitutional muster. Both cases involve parolee
defendants and both statutes at issue are DNA database statutes that
require DNA samples from felons. Not only are the facts and statutes
similar, but one can also argue that the overwhelming public interest
in creating a comprehensive nationwide DNA bank to improve the
accuracy of criminal prosecutions is even stronger in Kincade than in
Rise, which involved a DNA sampling law limited to Oregon felons.
Society's concern for felon recidivism only enhances this already
compelling interest.5 Additionally, under the DNA Act, samples are
collected in a uniform, non-discretionary manner, which prevents the
DNA sampling from being subject to random or arbitrary acts of
government agents. This further supports the constitutionality of the
DNA Act. 5'
One can also argue that Rise does not control Kincade. Rise
differs from Kincade in that the DNA Act covers a broader category
of felons than the Oregon DNA sampling law, which focused on
murderers and sex offenders.'52 Rise is also arguably inconsistent with
Supreme Court authority, as its validity has been undermined by the
subsequent Supreme Court decisions of Edmond and Ferguson.
146. Id. at 1560.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 1561.
149. Id. at 1562.
150. See United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 120 (2001).
151. See, e.g., Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 672 n.2
(1989); Rise, 59 F.3d at 1561-62.
152. United States v. Miles, 228 F. Supp. 2d 1130 (E.D. Cal. 2002).
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Thus, one can argue that Rise does not bind subsequent panels. '53
United States v. Miles supports this argument, and it is the only case,
other than Kincade, which has held a statute mandating DNA
samples for the CODIS database unconstitutional after Edmond and
Ferguson. In Miles, the Eastern District of California found the
DNA Act satisfied no need beyond ordinary law enforcement, was
not based on individualized suspicion, and, thus, was an
unconstitutional general law enforcement search violating the Fourth
Amendment. " ' The Miles court found that Edmond and Ferguson
"effectively overruled Rise.' 56 One could also arguably construe that
Edmond and Ferguson essentially overturned or at least undercut all
prior decisions that found DNA database statutes constitutional, as
the principle of stare decisis may yield where prior decision's
"underpinnings [have been] eroded by subsequent decisions" of the
Supreme Court.'57
Regardless of whether Edmond and Ferguson have
fundamentally changed the law with respect to DNA databases and
parolees, one can easily argue that Miles itself is not binding on
Kincade. The facts in Miles are quite distinguishable from Kincade's
facts. In Miles, the offender was on supervised release for a non-
qualifying offense under the requisite statute.'58 Kincade, on the
other hand, was under supervision for his qualifying offense of armed
bank robbery, and thus had more reason to expect he would be
required to comply with conditions related to his qualifying offense.
In Miles, the prosecution was trying to use a thirty year old conviction
as Miles' qualifying offense, to which the Miles court responded by
stating:
Here ... there is no connection between [the] defendant's
current supervised release and his 1974 conviction for the
qualifying offense... [h]aving fully served his sentence for that
crime, defendant had an objectively reasonable expectation that
after three decades the government would not be able to use
153. United States v. Montgomery, 150 F.3d 983, 998 (9th Cir. 1998). See also Miles288 F.Supp. 2d at 1132-33; United States v. Reynard, 220 F.Supp. 2d 1142, 1166 n.29 (S.D.
Cal. 2002) (stating that Rise does not completely control because it potentially conflicts
with Ferguson).
154. Miles, 228 F.Supp. 2d at 1130.
155. id.
156. Id. at 1135.
157. United States v. Gaudin, 515 U.S. 506, 521 (1995).
158. Miles, 228 F. Supp. 2d at 1132.
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that offense as a justification for invading his bodily integrity
and obtaining his identifying information without some
individualized suspicion of criminal wrongdoing. 9
The facts and issues in Kincade do not deal with the whether
someone in Miles' particular position is unconstitutionally searched
by a DNA collection statute. Thus, Miles is distinguishable from
Kincade.
Moreover, Miles, through one of the opinion's more problematic
passages, highlights the argument that Ferguson and Edmond may
not even apply to parolees, an argument also explored above. The
court in Miles cited as a distinction, but without a difference, that the
persons affected in Ferguson and Edmond were free citizens, and the
persons affected by the DNA collection statute were convicted felons,
in prison, on parole, or supervised release.1 ' One could argue that
this is in fact a distinction with a very important difference. As
mentioned above, persons under parole are not free citizens and are
in a considerably different position than the pregnant women or
random motorists affected by the statutes at issue in Ferguson and
Edmond. Parolees' privacy interests are diminished, and as a felon
on parole for a felony conviction, parolees are not entitled to the
same consideration as a free citizen without such criminal history and
status.6 ' Thus, as highlighted by the flawed passage in Miles,
Ferguson and Edmond may change the way in which DNA collection
challenges are analyzed, but they do not necessarily impose a
requirement of individualized suspicion in cases where the "special
needs" exception applies to DNA database statutes governing
parolees.
X. Judicial Subjectivity
What drove the Ninth Circuit in Kincade to initially choose to
disregard the overwhelming trend of courts to uphold such DNA
database statutes as constitutional, and then barely reverse their
decision with a close 6-5 judgment? Perhaps it is a reflection of the
particular justices' stances on the extent the government can
permissibly intrude on parolees' rights and the breadth of the DNA
Act's applicability. These personal opinions motivate the justices to
find justifications to support their positions, and the malleability of
159. Id. at 1138.
160. Id. at 1135.
161. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 875 (1987).
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the Fourth Amendment analysis gives them the room to bolster their
respective points of view. Fundamental divergences of opinion lead
the justices to interpret and apply the law differently: construing the
goal of the DNA Act as "deterrence of supervised releasees" or as
getting "evidence of past crime,"'62 or interpreting the DNA Act as
narrowly applying only to parolees versus fearing the Act's potential
expansion to include every American citizen.63 By juxtaposing the
Ninth Circuit decisions of Kincade and Rise as well as the 2003 and
2004 Kincade decisions, one can see how individual standpoints of thejustices can result in drastically different and closely contested
outcomes, even within the same circuit court.
XI. Conclusion
Regardless of whatever internal motivations drove the individual
justices' stances, the majority of the Ninth Circuit in its 2004 decision
recognized that Rise still controls, given that Rise and Kincade are
substantially similar and that Rise's holding is consistent with all other
cases, save one anomalous case. While the majority in the August
2004 opinion did not expressly articulate the ramifications of
upholding the October 2003 decision, they likely recognized that
striking down the DNA Act as unconstitutional would have likely
resulted in widespread and destructive consequences. Scores of cases
would have been overturned. The floodgates of litigation would have
been opened. The CODIS would have essentially been rendered
meaningless with the requirement of individualized suspicion of a
specific criminal act for each felon before gathering a DNA sample is
permitted. Many questions are still unresolved, such as the
constitutionality of expanding the scope of law enforcement
databanks. They will likely remain unresolved in the absence of a
definitive ruling by the Supreme Court. Yet, faced with the DNA
Act, binding precedent, and the facts before them, the Ninth Circuit's
final decision was correct to uphold the DNA Act as constitutional.
162. United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 841 n.2 (9th Cir. 2004).
163. Id. at 835-36.
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